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CHINA’S APPROACH ON DATA PRIVACY 
LAW:  




Because of state surveillance, data privacy in China is often assumed to be inexistent. Yet, the 
country regulates differently privacy from the state and privacy from private actors. Consumer data 
privacy in China is at the forefront of new regulations issued during the last years to create a legal 
framework on data protection, up to the Cybersecurity Law. Despite the tremendous increase of 
data transfers from the West to China, there is a scarcity in the legal research about Chinese data 
protection rules, the building of China’s approach on this domain and its consequences. 
This Article compares China’s data privacy laws (most notably the Cybersecurity Law and its 
guidelines) to the dominant approaches coming from the EU and the U.S. The goal is to identify 
China’s direction, whether it transplants their rules, and the specificities that make China’s 
approach different from Western models. The results of this comparative study show that China 
initially followed a path resembling the U.S. approach, before recently changing direction and 
converge with the more stringent EU rules on several legal elements, especially through the 
Cybersecurity Law and the Personal Information Security Specification. Up to the point that 
China now has a comprehensive data protection law on its legislative agenda and encourages 
privacy protection for consumers that sometimes surpasses U.S. rules. 
This research identifies and decrypts specificities of data protection in China that make China’s 
voice special with the potential to gain influence in this field, whereas Western rules are the only 
bearing regulatory clout so far. These Chinese characteristics, such as the paradoxical – yet parallel 
– increase of both state surveillance and consumer privacy and the cyber-sovereignty principle 
impacting personal data protection, now compose China’s approach. This “data privacy with 
Chinese characteristics” will bear consequences on the country’s forthcoming regulations on 
artificial intelligence and for future policy developments in the EU and the U.S. 
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
China is undergoing a rapid development of its data privacy 
framework. While the legal literature on personal data protection and 
privacy1 focuses on the EU and the U.S. approaches, little 
consideration is given to Chinese laws. The predominance of the EU 
and the U.S. in personal data processing and transfers, coupled with 
their starkly opposed approaches, explain why it concentrates the 
debates. But the ever-increasing data exchanges and use of Chinese 
technologies in the West convey the need for such research. On the 
other hand, there was admittedly little material on data privacy in China 
to be analyzed and compared until recently, and the discussions on 
privacy in China revolved around concerns on state surveillance (they 
still mostly do). Therefore, this Article proposes to identify China’s 
direction on data protection, especially in comparison to the EU and 
the U.S. approaches, to underline the specificities that make it unique 
and the consequences they may engender in the field. 
Unlike the EU and the U.S., data protection regulations in 
China are overdue. In 2010, Xue argued that “[b]oth the domestic 
social economic development and the international trade and 
economic exchange will eventually push China to observe the 
international standard of privacy and personal data protection.”2 For 
Greenleaf in 2012, “China’s direction [on data protection] is 
unknown,” with only “piecemeal and incoherent” initiatives which led 
                                               
* Ph.D candidate in comparative law at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Koguan Law 
School, focusing on data protection and privacy rules in the EU, the U.S. and China. 
Data privacy consultant at Deloitte Cyber Risk services. I am grateful to the editors 
of the Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs for their remarkable editorial 
assistance, even during the pandemic. 
1 This Article uses “data protection” and “privacy” as synonyms. Research 
comparing both rights however find that, despite similarities, some differences exist 
under EU law, see generally Juliane Kokott & Christoph Sobotta, The distinction between 
privacy and data protection in the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR, 3 INT’L DATA 
PRIV. L. 222, 222–28 (2013). The authors argue that “[a] closer appreciation of the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of 
the European Union shows that despite substantial overlaps there are also important 
differences, in particular with regard to the scope of both rights and their limitation.” 
 2 Hong Xue, Privacy and personal data protection in China: An update for the year 
end 2009, 26 COMPUTER L. & SEC’Y REV. 284, 289 (2010). 
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him to leave China out of his seminal comparative article.3 However, 
he stated that if these are “replaced or supplemented by a national data 
privacy law, China may well influence developing countries and 
China’s trading-partners.”4 By 2014, China had taken the first steps to 
bring protection to personal data but its approach was still very limited 
compared to other nations. This situation let scholars expecting more, 
with the vision that China’s voice on data privacy will become more 
influential.5 Only four years later, in 2018, an expert who took part in 
the drafting of China’s latest guidelines stated that “we are stricter than 
the U.S., but not as much as the EU.”6 Such a statement, if verified, 
suggests significant changes in Chinese laws within a relatively short 
timeframe and that China positions itself as in between the U.S. and 
EU approaches. This Article, then, is the first substantial effort to 
compare and position Chinese laws on data privacy with the EU and 
U.S. models, and determine their direction and underline the 
specificities that constitute China’s own nascent approach.7 
The EU and U.S. models are indeed well established, yet 
antagonistic. Both sides of the Atlantic have a different philosophy 
underlying their approach, which leads to differences in the legal 
instruments used and the level of protection afforded to individuals. 
In the EU, the rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data 
are both fundamental rights and are protected by a comprehensive 
                                               
 3 Graham Greenleaf, The influence of European data privacy standards outside 
Europe: implications for globalization of Convention 108, 2 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 68, 72 
(2012). 
 4 Id. at 72. 
 5 LEE ANDREW BYGRAVE, DATA PRIVACY LAW: AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 209 (2014). Bygrave states that “[China] will increasingly have a voice 
on data privacy issues, although the importance of its message remains to be 
deciphered, let alone clearly heard” (alteration to the original). 
 6 Yanqing Hong, Responses and explanations to the five major concerns about the 
Personal Information Security Specification, WEIXIN (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/rSW-Ayu6zNXw87itYHcPYA. 
 7 But see the work of experts such as Graham Webster (Editor-in-Chief of 
the Stanford-New America DigiChina Project at the Stanford University Cyber 
Policy Center and China Digital Economy Fellow at New America) and Samm Sacks 
(Senior Fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center and a Cybersecurity 
Policy Fellow and China Digital Economy Fellow at New America), supporting 
similar ideas in their reports, commentaries and contributions in media cited in this 
Article. 
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legal standard. The law has a wide scope; it applies to all organizations 
collecting and processing personal data. Personal data is broadly 
defined to cover all information relating to an individual. The law 
provides strong guarantees for those individuals, that the General Data 
Protection Regulation (“GDPR”)8 recently furthered, confirming the 
EU direction. In the U.S., conversely, there is no federal law covering 
all aspects of data privacy. Relevant provisions are instead scattered 
among many laws regulating different topics and sectors, with a variety 
of scope. They may concern government agencies, data on children, 
health data, focus on data breaches and being a federal law or a state 
law. They typically establish less requirements and offer less protection 
than in the EU. The EU model is proven to be increasingly influential 
on third-countries’ laws9 at the expense of the U.S. way which has not 
attained the same success.10 If, in terms of consumer data privacy, 
China shows signs of convergence toward the EU model, it would 
leave the U.S. isolated with its minimalist approach. 
China started to develop its data privacy framework much later 
than the EU and the U.S. Faced with the problem of lacking these 
regulations (such as numerous data breaches), China has the possibility 
to turn to existing models solving the same issue, and to import their 
rules into its domestic law. This phenomenon, called legal 
transplantation (“the moving of a rule or system of law from one 
country to another”),11 is well-known in comparative law scholarship. 
This Article finds that China did progressively include international 
principles of privacy and data protection in its laws, initially at a very 
slow pace. The country first considered going the EU route with a 
comprehensive law covering the entire scope of personal data, before 
renouncing and resorting to a U.S.-like approach, i.e. several sectorial 
                                               
 8 Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. 
 9 See generally Greenleaf, supra note 3. 
 10 See generally Ryan Moshell, And then there was one: The outlook for a self-regulatory 
United States amidst a global trend toward comprehensive data protection, 37 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 357 (2004). 
 11 ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW 21 (1 ed. 1974). 
2020 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 8:1 
54 
laws offering limited protection. But, unlike in the U.S., data privacy 
rights focus solely on consumers whereas citizens do not enjoy the same 
level of protection as part of their civil liberties. Bearing this difference 
in mind, consumer privacy in China continued to progress through 
various types of legal instruments, either binding or non-binding—the 
latter being more influential that could be assumed from a Western 
point of view. These progresses now culminate with data protection 
principles in Chinese rules going beyond what exists in U.S. laws and 
the OECD guidelines on data privacy (“OECD Privacy Guidelines”),12 
getting closer to the EU on such requirements as additional safeguards 
for sensitive data, processing of personal information only for the 
purpose initially specified to the individual, or data portability. 
Given the legal and political differences between Western 
countries and China, a straightforward transplantation would face 
significant challenges. China instead does not depart from its own 
rationale, and even creates specificities of its own, in the same way that 
EU and U.S. different underlying philosophies engender their 
divergent approaches. Like the well-known “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” developed by Deng Xiaoping,13 there is a “data privacy 
with Chinese characteristics,” made notably of the consequences of the 
cyber-sovereignty principle and the separation between privacy from 
private actors and privacy from the government. This reflects both the 
country’s sociopolitical context and geopolitical ambitions, and defines 
China’s own approach to the question. 
The present research develops and details these arguments in 
the following way: Part I briefly presents EU and U.S. approaches and 
outlines their differences. This frames the two models China could 
import rules from and that serve as references throughout this study. 
Part II focuses on the first period of China’s building of its legal 
                                               
 12 Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data (OECD Privacy Guidelines), 1980, OECD, 
https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-guidelines.pdf. 
 13 Deng Xiaoping first used the phrase in his Opening Speech at the Twelfth 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China, on September 1, 1982. Deng 
Xiaoping, Opening Speech at the Twelfth National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China (Sept. 1, 1982), http://en.people.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1010.html 
(last visited Sep 6, 2019). 
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framework and details the legal instruments used. It shows that the 
Chinese approach first scatters data protection provisions in various 
laws, which resembles the U.S. way, before widening the scope of its 
rules and now being on the verge of adopting a comprehensive law on 
data privacy, the type of legal instrument that the EU favors. Some of 
this progress happens through non-binding texts, but the study 
underlines their special status in China’s legal system. Part III then 
performs a deeper analysis on the content of the latest laws, i.e. the 
Cybersecurity Law and its accompanying non-binding standard, being 
the most significant and comprehensive rules in China to date. The 
comparative analysis demonstrates a significant change in China’s 
direction: while some key legal elements remain notably different from 
EU rules and still closer to the U.S. approach, others bear eloquent 
signs of EU influence. Finally, Part IV goes beyond the comparison 
and supports that China’s data privacy legal framework is more than a 
legal transplantation of pre-existing Western models and instead 
features characteristics that are specific to China, together with the 
legal transplants. Undoubtedly, this “data privacy with Chinese 
characteristics” will globally weigh in on future policy developments 
and discussions. 
II. EU’S STRONG PROTECTION OR U.S.’S MINIMALIST APPROACH: 
THE TWO MODELS FOR CHINA 
The EU and the U.S. began to build their legal framework on 
data protection around the same time. However, they each have their 
own philosophy underlying their approach, which led them to feature 
significant differences in both legal instruments (I.A) and level of 
protection. (I.B) 
A. Underlying Philosophy and Legal Instruments 
The EU and the U.S. both have a long experience in regulating 
the protection of personal information. Conversely, China, like other 
countries, developed its data privacy laws later than these two blocks. 
In the field of comparative law, the literature on legal transplantation 
shows that a country confronting a problem will first turn to solutions 
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developed in foreign countries to solve a similar issue.14 A well-known 
example of legal transplantation in China is the Anti-Monopoly Law, 
which borrows from both European and U.S. rules.15 In personal data 
protection, China also has these two reference models to draw 
inspiration from. However, the U.S. and EU models are largely 
diverging from each other. 
Data protection emerged at the same time in the U.S. and in 
EU Member States, during the 1970s. Both were based on common 
data protection principles.16 In the beginning of the 1980s, the OECD 
issued its Privacy Guidelines and the Council of Europe passed the 
Convention 108,17 both featuring a set of core data protection 
principles. The OECD Privacy Guidelines are a soft law instrument 
and its basic principles are considered to be the minimum international 
standards, widely found in data protection laws.18 On the other hand, 
the Convention 108 contains more stringent provisions than the 
OECD Privacy Guidelines and is the only international legally binding 
                                               
 14 Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal 
History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 
845–46 (2003). Miller identified several types of legal transplants from one country 
to another. Among them, the “cost-saving transplant” happens when a country uses 
a reference model to transplant rules from, rather than creating its own approach at 
the expense of a long and costly process. Other types of transplants are the 
externally-dictated transplant, the legitimacy-generating transplant and the 
entrepreneurial transplant. 
 15 See, e.g., Wentong Zheng, Transplanting antitrust in China: economic transition, 
market structure, and state control, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 643 (2010). 
 16 Colin J Bennett, Different Processes, One Result: The Convergence of Data 
Protection Policy in Europe and the United States, 1 GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. POL’Y AND 
ADMIN. 415, 421–24 (1988). Bennett noted the similarities of regulations from 
countries having different cultural and legal backgrounds, which allows to identify a 
common core of data protection principles. As a result, “[w]hile the codification of 
these principles may vary, their substance is strikingly similar.” 
 17 Council of Europe Convention 108: Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, 
E.T.S. 108. 
 18 Greenleaf, supra note 3, at 73. 
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instrument in the field, meaning that countries adhering to the 
convention must pass laws reflecting its principles.19 
Differences between U.S. and EU approaches started to 
appear when the European Commission asked EU Member States to 
ratify the Convention 108, leading them to bring in their laws more 
stringent protections than recommended by the OECD Privacy 
Guidelines. From then on, differences between EU and U.S. 
approaches were characterized by their choice of legal instruments, 
their scope and the level of protection afforded to individuals. These 
elements amount to a great divergence between the two. The 
underlying reason for it is the rationale that drives each of these 
approaches. In the EU, abuses on privacy and personal information 
during and after World War II justified providing strong protections, 
as exemplified by early German and French rules.20 Privacy and 
personal information protection are now fundamental rights in the 
EU.21 In the U.S., data privacy rights are balanced with other interests 
such as commerce and state security agencies;22 moreover, data privacy 
                                               
 19 Despite being from the Council of Europe, and even if members to the 
Convention were all European initially, the Convention is open to any country for 
ratification; recently more and more foreign countries are joining it or considering 
doing so: “Although it originated from the Council of Europe, since 2011 data 
protection Convention 108 is steadily being ‘globalised’. In addition to its 47 
European parties, five countries outside Europe are now Parties: Uruguay, Mauritius, 
Senegal, Tunisia and Cape Verde . . . Four more countries have had Accession 
requests accepted, but have not yet completed the accession process: Morocco, 
Argentina, Mexico, and Burkina Faso. Eleven other countries, or their [data 
protection authorities], are now Observers on its Consultative Committee”, 
GRAHAM GREENLEAF, Convention 108+ and the Data Protection Framework of the EU 
(Speaking Notes for Conference Presentation) (2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3202606. 
 20 Moshell, supra note 10, at 359. 
 21 In its Article 8, the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the European Union 
provides that everyone has the right to the protection of personal data, which should 
be processed on a legitimate legal basis such as consent, that everyone has the right 
of access to their personal data and the right to have it rectified, and that an 
independent authority shall control compliance with these rules. Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec.7, 200 art. 8, 2012/C 326/02. 
 22 Shawn Marie Boyne, Data Protection in the United States, 66 AM. J. COMP. L. 
299, 301 (2018); Stephen Cobb, Data privacy and data protection: US law and legislation, 
ESET WHITE PAPER 1 (2016). 
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finds itself facing the right to free speech as protected by the First 
Amendment of the U.S. constitution23—sometimes referred to as “the 
most significant factor in counterbalancing privacy protections in the 
U.S.”24 
The first main consequence of it bears on the legal instruments 
used to protect personal data. The EU built its model through one 
main law that governs the field, known as a “comprehensive data 
protection law.” This model took shape in 1995 with the Directive on 
data protection (Directive 95/46/EC),25 with two main goals: the 
protection of fundamental rights of natural persons, in particular their 
right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data and to 
prevent barriers to the free flow of data in the Union.26 It has since 
been replaced by the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”)27 
in 2018. This comprehensive law is complemented by rules operating 
as a lex specialis, such as the E-Privacy Directive28 and the forthcoming 
E-Privacy Regulation, whereas the comprehensive law is the lex 
                                               
 23 U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 24 UNITED STATES - THE PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION AND 
CYBERSECURITY LAW REVIEW 269 (Alan Charles Raul, Frances Faircloth, and Vivek 
K. Mohan, eds., 4 ed. 2017). See also Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: 
a Turn To Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1976–77 (2013). 
Schwartz reminds that in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the Supreme Court struck down a 
Vermont law against the sale of information about doctors’ prescribing practices by 
retailers (then used to target doctors for the sale of pharmaceuticals), as the Court 
held that the law violated the First Amendment. 
 25 Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
October 24, 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281). 
 26 Id. at art. 1. 
 27 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of April 27, 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR), 2016 O.J. (L 
119/1). 
 28 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
July 12, 2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of 
Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (E-Privacy 
Directive), as amended by the EU telecoms reform package from November 2009. 
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generalis. Under the GDPR, Member States have very limited 
possibilities for adapting the rules.29 This EU model is now followed 
by an increasing number of countries in the world.30 
Among countries that built a legal framework for the 
protection of personal information, the U.S. remains the greater 
exception to that trend.31 The U.S. situation is much more fragmented, 
where privacy is protected by a patchwork of common law, federal 
legislation, state law, and certain state constitutions.32 Scholars have 
found that the U.S. Constitution and its supporting body of 
jurisprudence do not provide adequate privacy protection and, 
therefore, the absence of a constitutional right to privacy means that 
data privacy acts could clash with constitutional rights, therefore 
limiting their effectiveness.33 The U.S. numerous legal instruments 
containing data privacy protections are sector-specific, as they regulate 
a narrow area, such as health care, communications, or finance and 
credit.34 
Among laws aimed at protecting from the government, the 
Privacy Act of 1974 applies to data processing by the federal 
government (but not state governments),35 the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, protects individuals from the 
interception of their electronic communications such as emails and 
other records by government officials, and the Family Educational 
                                               
 29 For example, Member States can define the age of a “child” in their 
domestic law, but within limits, according to Article 8(1) of the GDPR: “[ . . . ] the 
processing of the personal data of a child shall be lawful where the child is at least 16 
years old. [ . . . ] Member States may provide by law for a lower age for those purposes 
provided that such lower age is not below 13 years.” 
 30 GRAHAM GREENLEAF, Global Data Privacy Laws 2015: 109 Countries, with 
European Laws Now a Minority (2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2603529 (last visited Aug. 
13, 2019). 
 31 See generally Moshell, supra note 10. See also Greenleaf, supra note 3, at 70–
2. 
 32 Avner Levin & Mary Jo Nicholson, Privacy law in the United States, the EU 
and Canada: the allure of the middle ground, 2 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 357, 360 (2005). 
 33 Id. at 367. 
 34 Schwartz, supra note 24, at 1974–75. 
 35 Cited as Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 
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Rights and Privacy Act, safeguards students at institutions receiving 
federal funding from the disclosure of their personal data without their 
consent, in addition to the rights of access and modification. Among 
the main sectorial laws regulating the private sector, the 1996 Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act provides protection of 
personal information related to an individual’s health, and the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 protects the privacy 
of children under the age of 13 against collection and misuse of 
personal data by commercial websites. Other laws protect financial 
information, communications, video rental records, or telephone and 
family information.36 A large number of state laws add another layer of 
regulations. As an answer to growing concerns over data privacy, these 
state laws and their recent updates tend to increase the protections 
required from businesses to consumers.37 The most debated of them 
is the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”),38 often wrongly 
presented as similar to the GDPR39 or dubbed “California’s GDPR.”40 
Although the CCPA indeed significantly strengthens protections, it 
remains a law with a narrower scope and weaker protections than the 
EU standard.41 
                                               
 36 Levin and Nicholson, supra note 32, at 363–67. 
 37 Emmanuel Pernot-Leplay, EU Influence on Data Privacy Laws: Is the U.S. 
Approach Converging with the EU Model?, 18 COLO. TECH. L. J. (forthcoming). 
 38 Cal. Civ. Code ¶ 1798.100-198, taking effect on January 1, 2020. 
 39 E.g. Andy Patrizio, While no one was looking, California passed its own GDPR, 
NETWORK WORLD (July 5, 2018, 6:23 AM PDT 2018), 
https://www.networkworld.com/article/3286611/while-no-one-was-looking-
california-passed-its-own-gdpr.html. 
 40 E.g. Michael Bahar et al., California’s GDPR has become law, LEXOLOGY 
(June 29, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=639a495e-290c-
463b-9f6a-2656ed8b61f7. 
 41 The CCPA only protects California residents in their relationship with 
business as consumers (at the time of writing those lines, policymakers still discuss 
whether the CCPA should cover personal data of employees as well) and those 
concerned businesses must cross certain threshold to be subject to the law. The 
protections granted are significantly lower than the GDPR, e.g. there is no 
requirement for a legal basis for data collection and processing and the right of action 
for individual is limited to security issues in the context of a data breach (the bill SB 
561, which would have expanded the private right of action to allow consumers to 
sue for any violations of the CCPA has failed to pass in the Senate on May 16, 2019). 
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Not only do U.S. rules apply to a narrow set of entities, but 
they also limit their protection to U.S. citizens and residents,42 whereas 
EU rules protect the much broader identifiable natural persons, regardless 
of their citizenship.43 The definition of “personal information”—
which conditions the applicability of the protections—is also often 
narrower in the U.S.44 and requires the actual name of a person and 
information such as numbers identifying them directly45 to be part of 
a data set for them to be considered personal data. Due to the U.S. 
piecemeal approach, the very concept of personal information differs 
between the various legal instruments and there is no overarching 
definition of it.46 
Under the “notice and choice”47 mechanism, that the U.S. 
prefers to protect consumers’ personal information, the various 
obligations coming from these laws are typically stated in privacy 
policies where companies disclose their data practices, so individuals 
can choose to accept the collection and use of their data. The rationale 
being that consumers would favor the most protective companies, 
leading those companies to compete on privacy protection. However, 
this system’s efficiency is widely criticized.48 
                                               
 42 Privacy Act of 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2): “the term ‘individual’ means a citizen 
of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” The 
most recent state laws feature the same disposition, e.g. in California, the CCPA 
defines a consumer as “a natural person who is a California resident,” CCPA, 
1798.140.(g). 
 43 GDPR art. 4(1). 
 44 Paul Schwartz & Daniel Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the United 
States and European Union, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 877, 879 (2014). Certain laws feature a 
broadened definition, such as the CCPA. 
 45 E.g. in the latest Colorado rules on personal data protection (HB 18-1128, 
which took effect September 1, 2018, herein after “Colorado Consumer Data Privacy 
Law”), “personal information” is defined as a Colorado resident’s first name or first 
initial and last name in combination with “personal identifying information” such as 
the numbers assigned to a person (social security number, ID card number, driver’s 
license number . . ), Colorado Consumer Data Privacy Law § 3 (1)(g)(I)(A). 
 46 Schwartz and Solove, supra note 44, at 888. 
 47 Also called “notice and consent.” 
 48 See, inter alia, Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy harms and the effectiveness of the 
notice and choice framework, 11 ISJLP 485 (2015); Fred H. Cate, Protecting privacy in health 
research: the limits of individual choice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1765 (2010). 
2020 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 8:1 
62 
These differences in philosophies and legal instruments form 
a divergence in content and level of data protection. U.S. laws cover 
less core data protection principles and in a lighter manner than their 
EU counterparts.49 
B. Core Principles in Data Protection Laws 
Despite their opposition, data protection laws on both sides of 
the Atlantic share several core data protection principles, identified by 
previous research.50 According to Professor Paul Schwartz, a leading 
data protection law scholar,51 they are “the building blocks of modern 
information privacy law,”52 although not all laws on data protection 
contain the same number of principles nor do they give them the same 
meaning or depth.53 A comparison of data protection laws should 
therefore be based on those principles. They are often interdependent, 
sometimes intertwined. Some are shared by major sources across the 
world and known as “global standards,” while others are specific to 
European instruments—whether they created or significantly 
enhanced them—and referred to as “European standards.”54 
The core data protection principles were first explicitly listed 
in the 1970s in the U.S., before being a central part of the OECD 
Privacy Guidelines and the Convention 108, and spreading to the EU 
Directive 95/46/EC, the guidelines from the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”), or the APEC Privacy Framework55 among 
                                               
 49 Schwartz, supra note 24, at 1976. 
 50 See, e.g., Anneliese Roos, Core principles of data protection law, 39 COMP. AND 
INT’L L. J. OF S. AFRICA 102 (2006). Roos compares several sources in Europe and 
in the U.S. to identify a set of core data protection principles used in these legal 
instruments. 
 51 In relation to data protection principles, Schwartz proposes to apply all of 
them when information refers to an identified person, whereas information referring 
to an identifiable person should be protected by less principles, see Paul M. Schwartz 
& Daniel J. Solove, The PII problem: Privacy and a new concept of personally identifiable 
information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1880 (2011). 
 52 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and democracy in cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 
1614 (1999). 
 53 Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L. J. 902, 908 (2008). 
 54 Greenleaf, supra note 3, at 73. 
 55 The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”) is a forum promoting 
free-trade in the region, composed of 21 countries. To improve data protection 
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others.56 Among the most common principles found in legal systems, 
there are the requirements that data must be processed fairly and 
lawfully (fairness and lawfulness principle), data should only be 
processed pursuant to the purpose specified to the individual (purpose 
specification), only the personal information necessary for that 
purpose should be collected and processed and then be deleted (data 
minimization), such data should be relevant, accurate and up-to-date 
(data quality), individuals should be made aware of the processing and 
of their rights (transparency), these rights should allow individuals to 
exercise control over the processing, i.e. through modifying, rectifying 
or deleting the data or objecting to their processing (data subject 
participation), additional safeguards should be provided to special 
categories of data (sensitivity), all data should be appropriately 
protected against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, 
use, modification or disclosure of data (security and confidentiality), 
and data controllers should be accountable for compliance with 
measures giving effect to these principles (accountability).57 In addition 
to those principles, other requirements exist, such as having an 
independent supervisory authority dedicated to data protection, 
restrictions on cross-border transfers to countries with a lower level of 
protection, safeguards on automated decision-making, etc.58 
Some principles and requirements exist in both the EU and the 
U.S. but are more stringent in Europe, e.g. data minimization, 
transparency and data quality requirements are stricter in Europe. 
Some are simply missing in the U.S. approach, such as additional 
protection for sensitive data, restrictions on cross-border transfers, the 
need for a legal basis for data collection and processing, oversight by 
                                               
standards throughout member countries, the APEC adopted in 2004 a framework 
containing minimal data protection standards (APEC Privacy Framework). This 
framework is non-binding, countries can freely decide whether to implement the 
provisions it contains. 
 56 For a detailed analysis of the history of the fair information practice 
principles, see Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in 
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 343, 345–
55 (Jane K. Winn, ed., 2006). In this article, Cate argues against an overreliance on 
the “notice and choice” mechanism. 
 57 Roos, supra note 50. 
 58 Those additional elements will typically belong to the “European 
standards” category, as European rules contain more protections than others. 
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an independent supervisory authority, and limits on profiling and 
automated decision-making.59 Previous comparative research 
identified the spreading of EU standards in third countries’ laws; China 
was however excluded from its scope, because of the lack of rules to 
be studied.60 
Therefore, this Article proposes a framework for comparing 
data protection laws that assesses different legal areas: the underlying 
philosophy of the approach, the legal instruments employed for the 
regulation, and the presence and substance of core data protection 
principles. This study aims at outlining the direction of Chinese laws 
in regard to these two main approaches on data protection that are the 
EU and the U.S. models, i.e. China’s convergence with either of them, 
through the comparison of the above-mentioned elements. Because 
legal convergence implies dynamism and movement, it is different from 
the concept of similarity of laws. The practical particularity of a 
convergence research is thus the construction of the comparison 
within a timeframe, as exemplified by political science scholars.61 
Therefore, although a greater emphasis is put on the latest Chinese 
laws to precisely understand the current position, the main previous 
laws are also assessed to draw meaningful conclusions on the country’s 
direction. 
The relevant timeframe for China is much shorter than for 
most Western countries. It starts in the 1990s for the first mentions of 
“privacy,” and not before the 2010s for significant rules on “personal 
information protection” and the inclusion of core data protection 
principles. 
III. CHINA’S BELATED BUILDING OF ITS LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Chinese laws on data privacy arrived decades after most 
Western countries and China first hesitated between the EU and U.S. 
                                               
 59 Schwartz, supra note 24, at 1976. 
 60 Greenleaf, supra note 3, at 72. 
 61 Colin J. Bennett, What is policy convergence and what causes it?, 21 B. J. POL. 
SCI. 215, 230 (1991). Bennett’s theory on policy convergence is that it “should also 
be conceptualized in dynamic terms. The relevant theoretical dimension is time 
rather than space. Otherwise the concept becomes a synonym for similarity”. 
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approaches on legal instruments (II.A). Although the country 
eventually started to develop its legal framework through sector-
specific laws much like in the U.S. (II.B), China is now on the path of 
enacting a comprehensive data protection law as favored by the EU 
(II.C). 
A. The Late Emergence of Data Privacy Rights 
Before any data protection rule could exist in China, the 
country had to bring out the right to privacy, as the first step towards 
to the protection of personal information. In China like in other 
countries, the idea of privacy was initially very little developed. Across 
the world, different cultures led to the same lack of privacy protection. 
The prevalent characteristics of societies of that time—strict moral and 
behavioral social norms, important rural communities with deep social 
ties—constituted an adverse environment for privacy protection.62 
During the nineteenth century, the development of the urban life 
providing a relative anonymity among the multitude, coupled with new 
liberal ideas and individual rights gained through revolutions, led to the 
conception of the right to privacy. One of the first mentions of this 
right appeared in the U.S. in 1890.63 Scholarly discussions continued 
during the beginning of the twentieth century, but the right to privacy 
did not really flourish until after the Second World War, when the 
individual became more important in democratic legal systems—
which explains why China was not part of this movement. The 
corollary right to data protection appeared in the 1970s, following the 
spread of informatization, when the U.S. and several European states 
moved beyond privacy protection and issued their first laws focused 
on personal data protection, starting to build the two models discussed 
above.64 
                                               
 62 E.g. in France, prior to the French Revolution, impotent men had to fulfil 
their conjugal duty in public in order to avoid the annulment of marriage, see PIERRE 
DARMON, LE TRIBUNAL DE L’IMPUISSANCE: VIRILITÉ ET DÉFAILLANCES 
CONJUGALES DANS L’ANCIENNE FRANCE (1979). 
 63 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890). It defines the right to privacy as the “right to be let alone,” in a 
reaction to the development of journalism and gossip columns. 
 64 See supra Part I. 
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It has been argued that traditional Chinese culture caused the 
lack of privacy protection.65 However, in culturally similar regions, 
Taiwan has data protection laws going beyond OECD standards66 and 
Hong Kong was the first jurisdiction in Asia to have enacted a 
comprehensive data privacy law.67 In mainland China, it’s rather the 
political situation, at a time when privacy was making a breakthrough 
at international and national levels, that decisively precluded the 
emergence of privacy protection and set China apart from the 
developments happening elsewhere. 
While Western countries were expanding privacy rights to 
personal data protection, the concept of a right to privacy only started 
to appear in China, in a series of high-level laws not mentioning 
personal information protection. The Constitution from 198268 states 
the inviolable character of one’s personal dignity.69 Whereas protection 
of personal information does not appear, the right to freedom and 
privacy of correspondence is explicitly stated in Article 40,70 and 
privacy at home is implied in article 39.71 However, the Constitution 
                                               
 65 For a details discussion on those Chinese particularities, see Tiffany Li, Jill 
Bronfman & Zhou Zhou, Saving Face: Unfolding the Screen of Chinese Privacy Law, J. L., 
INFO., & SCI., 4 (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2826087. 
 66 Hui-ling Chen & Michael Fahey, Data protection in Taiwan: overview, 
PRACTICAL LAW (Oct. 1, 2018), https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/5-578-
3485?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1
. 
 67 YUETMING THAM, HONG KONG - THE PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION 
AND CYBERSECURITY LAW REVIEW (5 ed. 2018). 
 68 People’s Republic of China Const. (Dec. 1982) [hereinafter PRC Const.]. 
 69 PRC Const. art. 38: “The personal dignity of citizens of the People’s 
Republic of China is inviolable. Insult, libel, false charge or frame-up directed against 
citizens by any means is prohibited.” 
 70 PRC Const. art. 40: “Freedom and privacy of correspondence of citizens 
of the People’s Republic of China are protected by law. No organization or individual 
may, on any ground, infringe upon citizens’ freedom and privacy of correspondence, 
except in cases where, to meet the needs of State security or of criminal investigation, 
public security or procuratorial organs are permitted to censor correspondence in 
accordance with the procedures prescribed by law.” 
 71 PRC Const. art. 39: “The home of citizens of the People’s Republic of 
China is inviolable. Unlawful search of, or intrusion into, a citizen’s home is 
prohibited.” 
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cannot serve as the legal ground for a judicial decision or interpretation 
in China,72 which undermines the significance of these provisions. 
Civil and criminal laws now provide privacy and personal 
information protection. In 1986, the General Principles of the Civil 
Law (“GPCL”)73 protect the “right to reputation” and serve as a basis 
for privacy protection.74 On March 15, 2017, the GPCL received an 
update,75 providing rules for protection of personal data and 
underlining the responsibility of individuals and organizations for data 
protection and collection.76 The Criminal Law and its Amendment VII 
from 200977 sanction wrongdoings on privacy and personal 
information on several occasions. Article 252 states that attempting to 
infringe upon the right to freedom of correspondence is punishable by 
a prison sentence.78 As are activities of selling and illegally providing 
personal data by persons working at state organs or key institutions of 
finance, telecommunications, which they may have obtained during 
                                               
 72 Qianfan Zhang, A constitution without constitutionalism? The paths of 
constitutional development in China, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 950, 950–1 (2010). 
 73 General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
promulgated on April 12, 1986 and came into force on January 1, 1987. 
 74 For further discussion of the protection of privacy by the GPCL, see 
GRAHAM GREENLEAF, ASIAN DATA PRIVACY LAWS  : TRADE AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES 200–01 (2014), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199679669.001.0001. 
 75 The update took effect on October 1, 2017. 
 76 GPCL art. 111: “The personal information of natural persons is protected 
by law. Where any organization or individual needs to obtain someone else’s personal 
information, they shall obtain it in accordance with law and ensure information 
security; they must not unlawfully collect, use, process, or transfer the personal 
information of others, and must not unlawfully buy, sell, provide or disclose others’ 
personal information.” 
 77 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted on July 1, 1979 
(Criminal Law) and Amendment Seven to the Criminal Law, adopted on February 
28, 2009). 
 78 Criminal Law art. 252: “Whoever conceals, destroys or unlawfully opens 
another person’s letter, thereby infringing upon the citizen’s right to freedom of 
correspondence, if the circumstances are serious, shall be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of no more than one year or criminal detention.” 
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their service.79 The Tort Liability Law80 from 2010 explicitly protects 
the right of privacy for the first time,81 along with the right of 
reputation and the right of honor.82 The law also protects patients’ 
privacy data and medical history data as their disclosure requires 
consent.83 However, very few actions have been tried or accepted by 
the courts following the enactment of the Tort Liability Law.84 
In the regulation of businesses’ use of personal data, the first 
Chinese dispositions on the field were overall more concerned with 
public security than personal privacy.85 The emergence of innovations 
such as cloud computing and big data analytics convinced China to 
more vigorously regulate privacy, a trend later further encouraged by 
Edward Snowden’s revelations and by the related fear over foreign 
                                               
 79 Criminal Law art. 253 (A): “Where any staff member of a state organ or 
an entity in a field such as finance, telecommunications, transportation, education or 
medical treatment, in violation of the state provisions, sells or illegally provides 
personal information on citizens, which is obtained during the organ’s or entity’s 
performance of duties or provision of services, to others, shall, if the circumstances 
are serious, be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of no more than three years or 
criminal detention, and/or be fined. [ . . . ]” 
 80 The Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted at the 
12th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National People’s 
Congress of the People’s Republic of China on December 26, 2009, effective July 1, 
2010) (Tort Liability Law). 
 81 Hanhua Zhou, Consumer Data Protection in China, in CONSUMER DATA 
PROTECTION IN BRAZIL, CHINA AND GERMANY-A COMPARATIVE STUDY 42 (Rainer 
Metz et al. eds., 2016). 
 82 Tort Liability Law art. 2: “‘Civil rights’ as mentioned in this Law refer to 
personal and property rights and interests, including, inter alia, the right to live, right 
to health, right of name, right of reputation, right of honor, right to portrait, right to 
privacy, right of self-determination in marriage, guardianship, ownership, 
usufructuary right, real right for security, copyright, patent right, exclusive right to 
use trademark, right of discovery, stock rights, and right of inheritance.” 
 83 Tort Liability Law art. 62: “Medical organizations and their medical 
personnel shall ensure the privacy and confidentiality of patients. Medical 
organizations and their medical personnel shall bear tort liability if they disclose a 
patient’s private matters or medical records without the patient’s consent and cause 
damage to the patient.” 
 84 Li, Bronfman, and Zhou, supra note 65, at 24. 
 85 Yanfang Wu et al., A comparative study of online privacy regulations in the U.S. 
and China, 35 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL’Y 603, 613 (2011). 
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intelligence practices.86 Since, within this context of security 
enhancement, the inclusion of core data protection principles has 
started to grow. 
In December 2012, the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress (“NPC”)87 promulgated the Decision on 
Strengthening Information Protection on Networks, effective 
immediately (“the 2012 NPC Decision”), then the highest level law in 
China about personal information protection.88 The 2012 NPC 
Decision explicitly states that its goal is protect network information 
security, protect the lawful interests of citizens and to safeguard national 
security and social order89—a motivation that is unique to China and not 
found in EU or U.S. laws. It broadly applies to “network service 
providers and other enterprise and undertaking work units that collect 
or use citizens’ individual electronic information during their business 
activities.”90 The electronic information is defined as information that 
can identify citizens and involve their privacy.91 The Decision 
encompasses several core data protection principles. In particular, 
Article 2 which specifies that network service providers shall “abide by 
the principles of legality, legitimacy and necessity, clearly indicate the 
objective, methods and scope for collection and use of information, 
and obtain agreement from the person whose data is collected, they 
may not violate the provisions of laws and regulations, and the 
agreement between both sides, in collecting or using information.”92 
Following the Decision, China has made significant efforts and 
progress in terms of developing the protection of personal data 
                                               
 86 Graham Webster, Lecture at New York University, Shanghai Campus 
(Dec. 6, 2017). 
 87 The Standing Committee is the permanent body of the National People’s 
Congress and holds the legislative power with it. 
 88 Adopted on 28 December, 2012 at the 30th Committee Meeting of the 
11th NPC Standing Committee. Retrieved from 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/12/28/national-peoples-
congress-standing-committee-decision-concerning-strengthening-network-
information-protection (last visited Aug. 24, 2019). 
 89 Preamble of the 2012 NPC Decision. 
 90 2012 NPC Decision art. 2. 
 91 2012 NPC Decision art. 1. 
 92 2012 NPC Decision art. 2. 
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through including several principles and requirements as part of later 
rules. But rather than enacting an omnibus data privacy law in the 
European way, China continued on a path resembling the U.S. 
approach, with data protection provisions comprised in laws for 
sectors such as banking and finance, consumer protection, postal 
services, healthcare, credit reporting, telecommunications and internet, 
etc. 
B. Initial Preference for the Minimalist Approach 
China’s first preference for having several sectorial laws for the 
regulation of data privacy bears resemblance with the U.S. approach 
(II.B.1) although Chinese specificities can be observed through the 
special role of non-binding guidelines (II.B.2). 
1. Various Legal Instruments 
China nearly chose to follow the EU path on legal instruments 
when a personal data protection law was considered from 2005 to 
2008. This draft was based on data protection principles mostly similar 
to the OECD Privacy Guidelines and would have brought the country 
closer to global standards.93 The broad scope of the law would have 
been a first sign of convergence with the comprehensive law model 
promoted by Europe. While its content was closer to the OECD 
Privacy Guidelines and U.S. privacy laws, the instrument resembled 
the comprehensive law used in the EU, its content was not as 
protective.94 Interestingly, and unlike present rules in China, it explicitly 
included government authorities in its scope of application, although 
with less obligations than for the private sector.95 This law would have 
been a significant step from China in the direction of the Western 
practice of personal data privacy, but the project stalled, and the text 
remained a draft. It still is an influential reference years after its 
completion, used today when considering the possibility of a law 
                                               
 93 Xue, supra note 2, at 287. See also Graham Greenleaf, China’s Proposed 
Personal Information Protection Act, 91–2 PRIV. L. & BUS. INT’L NEWSL. 1 (2008). 
 94 Greenleaf, supra note 93, at 12. 
 95 Id. at 5–7. 
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dedicated to data privacy in China.96 It does shed light on a direction 
that was possible although not taken then, when today the possibility 
of a comprehensive data protection law in China is coming back in the 
legal debate.97 
Instead of going this route, China started to build a sector-
specific data privacy protection framework following the line of the 
2012 NPC Decision. As in the U.S. approach, data privacy 
requirements are included in several sectorial laws mainly concerning 
consumers privacy. In 2013, the NPC’s Standing Committee updated 
the Consumer Protection Law,98 making data protection a distinct right 
for consumers in its Article 14,99 and notably including the core data 
protection principles from the 2012 NPC Decision, especially on 
security and confidentiality, purpose specification and consent.100 
                                               
 96 See infra section II.C. Greenleaf noted in 2008 that whether or not this 
draft were to become law (which it did not), it “will remain significant as indicating 
some of the earliest and most detailed expert thinking on the subject of privacy in 
China,” Id. at 2. 
 97 See infra section II.C. 
 98 Decision on Amending the PRC Law on the Protection of Consumer 
Rights and Interests, adopted by the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National 
People’s Congress on October 25, 2013, and took effect on March 15, 2014. 
Consumer Protection Law (Including 2013 Amendments), retrieved from 
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/consumer-protection-law-including-2013-
amendments/?lang=en (last visited Aug 24, 2019). 
 99 Consumer Protection Law art. 14: “When purchasing or using goods or 
receiving services, consumers enjoy the right to personal dignity, the right to have 
their ethnic customs respected, and enjoy the right to have their personal information 
protected.” 
 100 Consumer Protection Law art. 29: “Proprietors collecting and using 
consumers’ personal information shall abide by principles of legality, propriety and 
necessity, explicitly stating the purposes, means and scope for collecting or using 
information, and obtaining the consumers’ consent. Proprietors collecting or using 
consumers’ personal information shall disclose their rules for their collection or use 
of this information, and must not collect or use information in violation of laws, 
regulations or agreements between the parties. 
Proprietors and their employees must keep consumers’ personal information they 
collect strictly confidential and must not disclose, sell, or illegally provide it to others. 
Proprietors shall employ technical measures and other necessary measures to ensure 
information security, and to prevent consumers’ personal information from being 
disclosed or lost. In situations where information has been or might be disclosed or 
lost, proprietors shall immediately adopt remedial measures. 
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However, they remain vague and general, and the rights of access, 
modification and deletion are missing. In 2013 the Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology (“MIIT”) adopted the 
Telecommunications and Internet Personal User Data Protection 
Regulation (“2013 MIIT Regulation”).101 The Regulation adds new 
requirements on top of earlier rules from 2011,102 which apply to the 
collection and use of personal user data in the process of providing 
telecommunications services and Internet information services within 
China and includes requirements of minimum data collection, notice 
and data breach notifications, meeting several of the OECD Privacy 
Guidelines principles. The 2013 MIIT Regulation applies to both ISPs 
and telecommunications business operators and is intended as an 
implementing measure for the 2012 NPC Decision. The broad 
definition of personal data,103 comprising identifiable information, has 
its roots in EU law. A number of sector specific laws followed the 2012 
NPC Decision.104 
                                               
Proprietors must not send commercial information to consumers without their 
consent or upon their request of consumers, or where they have clearly refused it.” 
 101 The 2013 MIIT Regulation was passed on June 28, 2013 at the 2nd 
ministerial meeting of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the 
People’s Republic of China and took effect on September 1, 2013. Retrieved from 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2013/07/16/telecommunications
-and-internet-user-individual-information-protection-regulations/ (last visited Aug 
24, 2019). 
 102 The text “Several Regulations on Standardizing Market Order for 
Internet Information Services” has been issued on December 7, 2011 and came into 
effect on March 15, 2012. 
 103 2013 MIIT Regulation art. 4: “Personal user data as named in these 
regulations, refers to users’ names, dates of birth, identity card number, address, 
telephone number, account number, password and other information with which the 
identity of the user can be distinguished independently or in combination with other 
information, as well as the time, and place of the user using the service and other 
information, collected by telecommunications business operators and Internet 
information service providers in the process of providing services.” 
 104 Inter alia, the Administrative Regulations on the Credit Reporting 
Industry of 2013; amendments to the Prevention and Treatment of Infectious 
Diseases Law in 2013; Administrative Provisions on the Medical Records of Medical 
Institutions of 2014; or the Security Measures on the Protection of Users’ Personal 
Information for Mailing and Courier Services of 2014. See Vincent Zhang & John 
Bolin, China Data Protection & Privacy, GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH (Aug. 2019) , 
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The most important milestone in China’s data protection legal 
landscape is the Cybersecurity Law (“CSL”), enacted on November 7, 
2016 by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
and which came into force on June 1, 2017. Requirements about data 
privacy are comprised among dispositions related to the other aspects 
of cybersecurity. The CSL has a broader scope than previous laws and 
brings the country even closer to global standards. As detailed below, 
personal data are defined similarly as in the GDPR, and the data 
protection principles have been improved compared to previous 
binding laws. The CSL covers several of them, although they are not 
as distinctly listed as they are in the guidelines accompanying the 
CSL.105 They are mostly in the first paragraph of article 41, requiring 
that “network operators collecting and using personal information 
shall abide by the principles of legality, propriety and necessity; make 
public rules for collection and use, explicitly stating the purposes, 
means, and scope for collecting or using information, and obtaining 
the consent of the person whose data is collected.”106 The second 
paragraph of this article relates to what network operators shouldn’t 
do, such as collecting personal information unrelated to the services 
they provide, violating the laws or agreements with the data subject, in 
their data collection and/or data processing activities: “Network 
operators must not gather personal information unrelated to the 
services they provide; must not violate the provisions of laws, 
administrative regulations or agreements between the parties to gather 
or use personal information; and shall follow the provisions of laws, 
administrative regulations and agreements with users to process 
personal information they have stored.”107 The CSL and its 
accompanying guidance text are discussed in more details in Part III. 
As these principles show, the requirements of the CSL remain 
so general that either a very strict or a very lenient interpretation would 
not breach the letter of the law—this delta being a source of legal 
                                               
https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/52/jurisdiction/27/data-protection-
privacy-china/. 
 105 See infra section II.B.2. 
 106 CSL art. 41. 
 107 Id. 
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uncertainty for businesses. To alleviate this situation, China makes use 
of guidance texts. 
2. The Role of Non-Binding Rules 
Generality and vagueness are typical traits of Chinese law. The 
legal literature commonly acknowledges that China’s legal system is 
characterized by laws broadly drafted and significantly flexible108—the 
CSL counts among this type of vague laws. The law contains many 
dispositions and definitions where the lack of precision gives rise to 
questions placing entities in a state of legal uncertainty.109 This provides 
the government with room for maneuver and flexibility in interpreting 
and enforcing the law, and can be construed as necessary to prevent 
the law from being rapidly outdated by evolution of usage and 
technological developments. The government may however use this 
vagueness to drive the implementation of the CSL in the way it sees fit 
according to the interests of the moment, even on a case-by-case basis 
that could lead to different implementation depending on the target.110 
To palliate the shortcomings of having vague binding laws, 
China uses non-binding texts to provide details and to guide the laws’ 
implementation. They set best practice standards that companies are 
encouraged to implement themselves voluntarily—in theory. To 
comprehend the breadth of this Chinese characteristic, the particular 
legal value of these texts should be outlined. This legal value is ruled 
by the Standardization Law from 2017,111 which sets two kinds of 
                                               
 108 See generally Deborah Cao, Chinese Law and Imprecise Language, in CHINESE 
LAW: A LANGUAGE PERSPECTIVE (2017). 
 109 Adeline Poisson, Extraterritorialité et protection des données personnelles  : aperçu 
comparatif en droit européen et droit chinois, INSTITUT DE DROIT COMPARE DE PARIS 
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 111 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Standardization 
Law of the People’s Republic of China, issued on November 4, 2017 and came into 
effect on January 1, 2018 (Standardization Law). It revises the 1989 Standardization 
Law. 
2020 China’s Approach on Data Privacy Law 8:1 
75 
standards: on the one hand, compulsory standards (annotated GB)112 
that shall be implemented to produce, import and/or sell products in 
China; and on the other hand, recommended standards (annotated 
GB/T) that can be adopted voluntarily.113 Both types of standards are 
drafted by a standardization technical committee or a group of experts, 
and draft versions are released to seek opinions. Compulsory 
requirements are those providing requirements for “safeguarding 
human health and the safety of the person, state security, ecological 
environment security, and meeting fundamental needs of social and 
economic administration.”114 Specifications on personal data 
protection fall out of this category and their implementation is 
therefore only recommended in principle. However, they are to be 
taken as “quasi-implementing rules,”115 a “reference point” for 
regulators116 which reflect their thinking on data privacy.117 These non-
binding rules show China’s direction on data protection and how 
authorities are likely to interpret the laws, which makes them more 
important than voluntarily frameworks in a Western context.118 
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In the field of personal data protection, the most important of 
these rules are the 2018 Specification,119 and before it the 2013 MIIT 
Guideline.120 The 2013 MIIT Guideline has a broader scope than 
binding laws at the time, covering more businesses than the binding 
MIIT Regulations from 2011 and 2013. More issues are addressed, 
such as data exports and data subjects’ access and correction rights. 
Eight basic principles are set out, similar to those found in the OECD 
Privacy Guidelines, such as purpose specification, a soft data 
minimization requirement (not on par with its EU equivalent), 
transparency, data quality, lawfulness (although the only legal basis 
allowed is consent, and therefore implicit consent), accountability and 
security.121 The text also shows certain signs of convergence with the 
EU model, as, for the first time in China, the sensitivity principle 
appears: the difference is made between sensitive information and 
other personal information, requiring additional safeguards to protect 
the former. The improvement on the compliance with international 
practice led to identify the document as being a possible basis for a 
future comprehensive data protection law.122 Although this did not yet 
                                               
 119 The “Information Security Technology – Personal Information Security 
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happen, the 2018 Specification draws upon the 2013 MIIT Guideline 
and improves it. 
As above-mentioned, whereas the CSL centralizes dispositions 
on personal information protections, it contains only a few articles 
with vague wording that need clarification. Among the several 
guidelines accompanying the law, the 2018 Specification is the one 
focusing on personal data privacy.123 Because of the scarcity of 
dispositions in the law, creating a comprehensive guidance was a 
challenge for the drafters; to palliate this lack, they acknowledged that 
they looked to foreign rules and transplanted rules that benefited from 
the more mature experience of foreign countries.124 It provides core 
data protection principles, which are defined and outlined in a much 
clearer manner than in the CSL, in particular the principles of purpose 
specification, transparency, lawfulness (although with consent as the 
only legal basis, as in the 2013 MIIT Guideline), participation, security, 
sensitivity and a requirement of data minimization that now matches 
the EU strictness (only the data necessary for the purpose should be 
processed and not those related to it, as was the case in the 2013 MIIT 
Guideline).125 Some of these principles show strong signs of 
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convergence with the EU standards.126 Despite its non-binding nature, 
the 2018 Specification represents the level of protection that data 
controllers in China should be aiming for. As the Standardization Law 
requires, the final version of the Specification follows a draft that was 
issued in order to collect public opinions, and which did bear some 
differences.127 Propositions for amendments to the current version are 
now being discussed on topics such as consent requirements or data 
breach notification. 
These guidelines are useful in providing details missing in laws. 
For example, both the 2012 NPC Decision and the CSL mandate a 
privacy notice requirement, without stating what terms ought to be 
included. Useful precisions and details are however present in both the 
2013 MIIT Guideline and the 2018 Specification. Other examples of 
the kind exist in the level of details for security and data subject’s 
participation. Most importantly, and as will be detailed in the next Part, 
those specifications recommend significantly strong protection for 
personal information. 
A parallel can be drawn here with the use of guidelines in the 
EU system, most notably those from the European Data Protection 
Board (“EDPB”),128 composed of representatives from all supervisory 
authorities in the EU. These guidelines seek to explain and illustrate a 
particular point of the data protection rules in a very detailed manner. 
Their format is however different. Whereas a guideline in the EU is an 
actual explanatory text, sometimes close to an instruction manual, 
Chinese guidance texts are organized by articles in the manner of 
binding laws, reinforcing their quasi-implementing character. 
C. Towards a Comprehensive Data Privacy Law 
Despite the initial choice to disseminate data protection 
provisions in many laws, the studying of the evolution of the rules’ 
                                               
 126 See infra section III.B. 
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scope and of China’s legislative agenda demonstrates that the country 
is getting closer to having a national data protection law, and therefore 
converging with the EU model on legal instruments, rather than 
continuing in the U.S. way. 
The CSL has a broad scope that is a significant sign of China’s 
intentions to group rules on personal data protection previously 
disseminated among dozens of laws, sometimes contradicting each 
other.129 The CSL applies to virtually any company: the dispositions 
related to data protection are applicable to “network owners, managers 
and network service providers”130 who collect and use information.131 
The focus on network is expected, as those dispositions exist in the 
context of a cybersecurity law and not purely a personal data protection law 
like in the EU or even a consumer privacy law as often found in the U.S. 
The term “network” encompasses the “systems comprised of 
computers or other information terminals and related equipment that 
follow certain rules and procedures for information gathering, storage, 
transmission, exchange and processing.”132 This is in fact the basic 
definition of a computer network, which in theory can make nearly 
every company a network owner. Even if the definition is narrowly 
interpreted, the CSL targets more organizations, and is less sectorial in 
nature, than previous laws containing privacy requirements. It is not, 
however, sufficient to classify it as a comprehensive law as promoted 
by the EU, which should apply to all organizations collecting and 
processing personal data. 
The 2018 Specification goes further and makes clear that it 
applies to “all types of organizations’ activities handling personal 
information.”133 This broad scope is similar to the GDPR. It is an 
improvement upon the Draft 2018 Specification, which did not apply 
to organizations employing fewer than ten people or earning less than 
RMB 1,000,000, that do not process more than 10,000 people’s 
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personal information in any continuous twelve-month period.134 The 
2018 Specification also provides a broad definition for data controllers 
(“an organization or individual that has the authority to determine the 
purposes and/or methods of the processing of personal 
information”)135 and for data subjects (“a natural person identified by 
personal information”).136 In the first draft of the Cybersecurity Law, 
the person identified or identifiable could only be a Chinese citizen; 
this was in line with the U.S. approach, where laws protect U.S. 
residents or a given state’s residents for state laws.137 The final version 
then broadened the definition to “natural person,”138 in line with the 
EU. 
As for the definition of “personal information,” the OECD 
and the EU agree in including all information related to a natural 
person identified or identifiable. As explained above, most U.S. legal 
instruments feature a narrow definition of personal information, 
comprising information that directly identifies a person.139 The CSL 
departs from the U.S. approach and prefers a broad definition of 
personal information, defining them as “all kinds of information 
recorded electronically or through other means, that taken alone or 
together with other information, is sufficient to identify a natural 
person’s identity, including, but not limited to, natural persons’ full 
names, birth dates, identification numbers, personal biometric 
information, addresses, telephone numbers, and so forth.”140 
The 2018 Specification contains the same definition and 
includes an indicative list of examples.141 These definitions give the 
2018 Specification a global scope, similar to comprehensive data 
protection laws in general and to the GDPR in particular. Regarding 
binding law, the scope of the CSL is narrower because it refers to 
network operators, although it has the potential to be broadly 
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interpreted especially under the lights of the specification’s guidance. 
This shows that China is moving away from the sector-specific 
approach to data protection that is favored by the U.S., and instead 
goes towards the EU model. 
As for the territorial jurisdiction, the GDPR has an 
extraterritorial scope, because it may apply to organizations established 
outside the Union when they offer goods or services to data subjects 
in the Union or monitor their behavior when it takes place in the EU.142 
Extraterritorial competence also exist in the U.S., for example, in 
California.143 In China however, the CSL is only applicable to 
operations happening within the country.144 
As a consequence of this trend, chances are high that China 
will soon enact a dedicated personal data protection law. The NPC 
Standing Committee’s Five-year Legislative Plan for the period 2018-
2023 features a “Personal Information Protection Law” that is now in 
the “mature” drafting stage.145 The drafting of this law was commented 
on in 2019 by Zhang Yesui, spokesman for the second session of the 
13th National People’s Congress, when he outlined that provisions on 
personal information were too scattered and so there is a need “to have 
a law specifically on the protection of personal information to form a 
unified force of regulation.”146 Although a previous draft for a privacy 
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act has been kept away since the 2000s,147 supporters of such law are 
optimistic that it will be enacted before 2023.148 According to the 
drafters of the 2018 Specification, the latest rules on personal data 
protection, there is a “high possibility that the future personal 
information law will be compatible with [the 2018 Specification].”149 
As the next Part demonstrates, this 2018 Specification is highly 
converging with EU rules. The law should therefore be more precise 
and further strengthen the requirements found in the CSL, bringing 
China one step closer to the EU model and to the large number of 
countries that adopted such law. It is likely that this convergence will 
continue and increase, which would leave the U.S. the last of the group 
not to have a dedicated and comprehensive law on data privacy. Apart 
from this convergence on legal instruments, a similar trend is 
observable for the content and meaning of the rules. 
IV. CHINA’S NEW DIRECTION: MORE PROTECTIVE THAN THE U.S., 
NOT AS STRICT AS THE EU? 
Dr. Hong, who led the drafters of the 2018 Specification, 
argues that these rules are “stricter than the U.S., but not as much as 
the EU.”150 Given China’s late awakening to the issue and the debates 
surrounding surveillance, such declaration may seem bold and conveys 
the need for a deeper analysis. The study of data protection principles 
and requirements contained in the newest Chinese rules show that they 
maintain similarities with the U.S. approach on several elements 
(III.A), but the CSL, and mostly the 2018 Specification, also features 
important signs of convergence with EU law (III.B). This indeed 
demonstrates a significant change in China’s direction, in favor of 
stronger data protection requirements than the U.S. but without going 
as far as the EU, but with Chinese characteristics that Part IV details. 
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A. Where China Remains Closer to the U.S. Than to the EU 
The legal elements illustrating the most that China conserves 
some resemblance with U.S. laws are the requirements on a legal basis 
for data collection and processing (III.A.1), as well as rules on data 
breaches and supervisory authorities (III.A.2). 
1. Requirements for Data Collection and Processing 
The principle of lawfulness of data processing is one of the 
most significant differences between EU and Chinese data protection 
principles, and a point where China is relatively in line with the U.S. 
The lawfulness requirement means that collection and processing 
should rely on a defined legal basis to be performed.151 The legal bases 
often found in data protection laws are: consent from the data subject; 
performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party; the 
processing is necessary for his vital interests; necessary for the 
compliance with a legal obligation that the data controller should abide 
by; for a task carried out in the public interest; or the processing is 
necessary for the legitimate interests of the data controller unless the 
rights and freedoms of the data subject override them.152 The GDPR 
provides all of the legal bases in its Article 6, with a strict conception 
of consent: it must be freely given, informed and unambiguous, which 
excludes implicit consent. On the opposite side of the spectrum, the 
U.S. approach strongly relies on individuals’ consent to data 
processing153 or even allows by default the collection and processing 
of personal data (without the need to rely on consent at all or any other 
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legal basis), unless forbidden by another law.154 Even the CCPA only 
lightly requires consent and does not list other legal bases.155 
In China, much like in the U.S., the CSL establishes consent as 
the only legal basis for data collection and processing and has a loose 
conception of it, allowing for implicit consent. While the CSL and the 
2018 Specification do not use the term implied,156 drafters of the 
specification later clarified that explicit consent is required only if the 
term explicit consent is expressly mentioned (e.g. for collecting sensitive 
information157), not where just consent is used.158 
A particularity of the CSL is that it does require consent at all 
times and does not allow collection or processing by default. But it 
does so without giving data controllers the possibility of using another 
legal basis when asking for consent is not practical. In the EU, this is 
done on the basis of the “legitimate interest” of the controller.159 To 
palliate this deficiency in China, entities will have to extensively use 
implicit consent for those purposes, which undermines its value. 
Drafters of the 2018 Specification attempted to remedy this problem, 
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but because they are not legislators they couldn’t go against the letter 
of the law; hence the inclusion of more legal bases was impossible, as 
they later explained.160 Nevertheless, the drafters included a series of 
exemptions to obtaining consent that partially cover GDPR’s legal 
bases, but without explicitly mentioning “legitimate interests.” Data 
controllers do not need to obtain consent to collect and process data 
where there is a direct relation to national security or defense,161 public 
health,162 criminal investigations or enforcement of judgments,163 
where it’s done to protect the life or major lawful rights of the data 
subject,164 or where the data has been lawfully and publicly disclosed 
previously.165 In addition, the final version of the 2018 Specification 
contains exemptions that were not present in earlier versions, such as 
where the processing is required for performing a contract,166 or 
“where used to preserve the secure and stable operations of products 
or services they provide, such as discovering or handling problems 
with the product or service.”167 The exemptions in Chinese law only 
partially resemble the legitimate interest basis in the GDPR168 because 
Article 6.1(f) of the GDPR is broader and can, for example, under 
certain conditions, justify data processing for direct marketing 
purposes.169 
Another core element where China does not put as much 
emphasis as the EU does is data quality. The data quality principle 
mandates that personal data should be relevant to the purposes for 
which they are to be used and, to the extent necessary for those 
purposes, should be accurate and kept up-to-date.170 All major sources of 
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data protection rules provide similar definition of personal data 
quality.171 In the U.S., the requirement of data quality is part of certain 
federal laws such as the Privacy Act, but not in state laws seen as more 
protective, for example, the CCPA or Colorado’s new consumer 
privacy rules.172 In China, the data quality principle is not clearly stated 
in the CSL. Article 42 prohibits tampering with or destroying the data 
collected but does not require to ensure that the data is accurate, 
relevant or up-to-date. Although the rights of correction and deletion 
can be “post-facto substitutes for data quality requirements”173—
because this provides a way for the data subject to ensure data 
relevancy and accuracy—it requires the subject’s precise knowledge 
and intervention, which in practice lowers the effective level of 
protection through the requirement of data quality. In fact, the data 
quality principle in the CSL remains embryonic at best. The 
requirement exists in the 2013 MIIT Guideline and was clearly 
expressed in the last Draft 2018 Specification,174 as a requirement for 
the data controller to ensure personal data’s accuracy, veracity, validity, 
and usability.175 Surprisingly, there is no mention of the principle in the 
final version of the 2018 Specification. Hence, China is still closer to 
the U.S. approach, where data quality is not systematically a 
requirement. 
2. Enforcement and Consequences in Case of Data Breaches 
In the U.S., requirements for data breach notification exist but 
are not as strict as in the EU. Moreover, there is no supervisory 
authority dedicated to the protection of personal information, whereas 
such authority is a fundamental part of the EU system. China is similar 
to the U.S. on both of these points, although the data security 
requirement is defined similarly in all three approaches. 
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Data security is a core data protection principle that is 
enshrined in data protection laws, because security and confidentiality 
are necessary for personal data privacy to be effective. This principle 
is present in almost all the early data protection instruments.176 
According to the OECD, “personal data should be protected by 
reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss or 
unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of 
data;”177 U.S. and EU laws are similar, featuring an appropriateness 
criterion as well. Because its main focus is on cybersecurity, the CSL 
has many requirements regarding this broader topic, such as 
infrastructure security and monitoring. On personal data especially, the 
law requires security but does not expressly mention the relative 
criterion. Article 40 states that “network operators shall strictly 
maintain the confidentiality of user information they collect, establish 
and complete user information protection systems” and Article 42 
adds they “shall adopt technological measures and other necessary 
measures to ensure the security of personal information they gather, 
and prevent personal information from leaking, being destroyed or 
lost.” The criterion is explicit in the 2018 Specification, as data 
controllers should “possess the appropriate security capacity taking 
into account the security risks faced, and employ sufficient 
management and technical measures to protect the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of personal information.”178 Therefore, EU, 
U.S. and China definitions on this requirement are similar. However, 
it’s when a security breach occurs that the consequences differ between 
the three approaches. 
A security problem can be the cause of a data breach. Once it 
occurs, the notification requirement obliges the entity in charge of the 
data to notify the supervisory authority and/or the affected 
individuals.179 Following the revision in 2013, the OECD Privacy 
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Guidelines encourage countries to adopt data breach notification laws. 
The Guidelines do not have any requirements on the timing of the 
notification, because the OECD estimates that more experience is 
required before doing so.180 The obligation to notify about the personal 
data breaches has existed in the U.S. since 2002.181 The timeframe for 
notification is large for example thirty days182 or even up to a 
reasonable time.183 A data breach notification requirement was absent 
from the EU Directive in 1995 (although included in some Member 
States national laws). Drawing on rules from Member States and the 
European Union Telecommunications Framework, the EU now goes 
further than both the OECD and the U.S. and compels data 
controllers to notify supervisory authorities of a security breach within 
seventy-two hours after the data controller became aware of it.184 They 
should notify data subjects as well if there is a high risk to their rights 
and freedoms.185 
In China, previous rules mandated that data controllers notify 
authorities but not individuals.186 The CSL now requires data 
controllers to inform authorities as well as individuals in case of a data 
breach: “When the leak, destruction or loss of personal information 
occur, or might occur, remedial measures shall be immediately taken, 
and provisions followed to promptly inform users and to make report 
to the competent departments in accordance with regulations.”187 The 
2018 Specification gives more details and requires companies to draft 
a personal information security incident response plan and organize 
drills annually.188 In case of a breach, affected entities should record a 
                                               
 180 OECD Privacy Guidelines, Explanatory Memorandum, 27. 
 181 California S.B. 1386, effective on July 1, 2003 (California Data Security 
Breach Notification Law). 
 182 For example, in Colorado, where notification to the affected Colorado 
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set of information about the incident, assess its impact, and report it 
in a timely manner.189 It further requires affected entities to promptly 
inform data subjects and provides a non-exhaustive list of information 
to be included in the notice.190 
But the 2018 Specification does not precisely quantify the 
timeframe for notification. By requiring prompt notification, the 
Chinese legislator may want to gain more experience before setting a 
clear timeframe, as does the OECD. Therefore, the new provisions of 
Chinese laws for data breach notification are an improvement towards 
global standards, without being as strict as EU rules. It does resemble 
more the U.S. approach, where notification within a reasonable time is 
a common requirement. 
The authority to which the notification should be made is not 
apprehended in the same way in the EU and the U.S. The first version 
of the OECD Privacy Guidelines didn’t explicitly mention data 
protection authorities, and the requirement of having an independent 
and dedicated authority is a European standard.191 The version 
following the 2013 revision now asks OECD Member countries to 
establish privacy enforcement authorities, free from instructions, bias 
or conflicts of interest,192 with the “governance, resources and 
technical expertise necessary to exercise their powers effectively and to 
make decisions on an objective, impartial and consistent basis.”193 
Europe considers it a crucial part in recognising that a third country 
guarantees a level of data protection essentially equivalent to its own.194 
                                               
 189 2018 Specification art. 9.1(c)3. 
 190 2018 Specification art. 9.2. 
 191 Greenleaf, supra note 3, at 73. 
 192 OECD, Explanatory Memorandum, 28. 
 193 OECD Privacy Guidelines ¶ 19(c). 
 194 This is done through the adequacy decision granted by the European 
Commission, which allows data transfers from the EU to the third country without 
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The independency of these supervisory authorities is a requirement for 
the authority itself but also for its members.195 As opposed to the EU, 
the U.S. does not provide for a regulatory oversight by an independent 
data protection authority,196 but rather a combination of “the US 
Federal Trade Commission, state attorneys general, the Federal 
Communications Commission, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (and other 
financial and banking regulators), the Department of Health and 
Human Services, the Department of Education, the judicial system, 
and [ . . . ] the US plaintiffs’ bar.”197 The Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) has grown to become the most important privacy 
enforcement agency in the US.198 
China’s CSL does not establish a data protection authority in 
the European sense. The Cyberspace Administration of China 
(“CAC”) has a general responsibility for planning and coordination 
cybersecurity efforts, a central role given by Article 8 of the CSL, but 
there are several regulators responsible for data protection 
enforcement efforts. The same article states that the Ministry of Public 
Security and the MIIT are responsible for network security protection, 
supervision and management efforts within the scope of their 
responsibilities, along with “other relevant organs” and “within the 
scope of their responsibilities.” Therefore, different authorities are in 
charge of data protection for their own sectors, in accordance with the 
sectorial approach that is still effective in China today. Those are, inter 
alia, the MIIT for telecommunications and information technology, 
the China Insurance Regulatory Commission for the insurance 
industry, or the China Banking Regulatory Commission for the 
banking industry. Much like in the U.S., there are several authorities in 
                                               
 195 GDPR art. 52. 
 196 Schwartz, supra note 24, at 1976. 
 197 UNITED STATES - THE PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION AND 
CYBERSECURITY LAW REVIEW, supra note 24, at 269. 
 198 Boyne, supra note 22, at 301; UNITED STATES - THE PRIVACY, DATA 
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charge of enforcing privacy provisions on their own sector, and the 
allocation of competence is not always clear.199 The CSL did not 
change the situation that still resembles the U.S. approach more than 
the EU’s. 
Several examples of enforcement have been reported since the 
CSL came in effect,200 but the law does not allow authorities to issue 
highly deterrent fines like the GDPR does in the EU, based on the 
company’s turnover. U.S. laws usually feature a different system, with 
a fine on a per violation basis, i.e. if the violation of the law concerns 
100 people, the fine will be multiplied by 100.201 Following the GDPR 
in the EU, and data privacy scandals in the US, sanctions for personal 
data breaches recently attained amounts that cannot be ignored by 
companies.202 Under the CSL, companies in China face significantly 
lower risks, as fines can only be up to RMB 1,000,000 (USD 150,000) 
or ten times the amount of unlawful gains from the misuse of data. 
However, authorities may order the business to temporarily suspend 
its operations, shut down the website or even cancel business licenses 
and relevant operations permits,203 which may have a deterrent effect. 
B. Signs of China’s Convergence with the EU Model 
Despite some key differences, certain new Chinese rules on 
data privacy bring more protection to individuals than the OECD 
Privacy Guidelines, most U.S. laws, even those state state laws regarded 
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as the most protective such as the CCPA. The following demonstrates 
that these stronger protections are often transplants of EU rules, 
showing the convergence of Chinese law with the EU model. As 
underlined below, most of those rapprochements come from the non-
binding 2018 Specification, whereas the CSL is often too vague to 
soundly demonstrate convergence. 
1. Transparency and Further Processing 
Transparency makes it possible for individuals to understand 
that their personal data is collected and processed, to know who the 
data controller is, their means to establish the existence and nature of 
personal data, the main purpose of their use, and their rights.204 The 
principle exists in the U.S., but EU rules are the example of thorough 
implementation of transparency,205 where transparency has been 
strongly reinforced with the GDPR compared with the previous 
Directive.206 In China, the 2012 NPC Decision requires “explicitly 
stating the purpose, manners and scope of information collection and 
usage” and is followed in it by the subsequent legislation.207 The 
Cybersecurity Law briefly makes the requirement to “make public rules 
for collection and use.”208 Then, the 2018 Specification is more specific 
and mandates data controllers to “disclose the scope, purpose, and 
rules for processing personal information in a clear and 
comprehensible manner and accept external oversight.”209 The 2018 
Specification again brings more clarity and precision than article 41 of 
the CSL. 
After the entity informs the individual of the intended use of 
the information demanded at the time of collection, this purpose 
constitutes the frame within which the data can be used— further 
processing, such as selling the data to a third party, cannot go against 
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this specified purpose. This requirement is known as the purpose 
specification principle.210 In China, the principle is established in article 
41 of the CSL, stating that a network operator cannot violate 
“agreements between the parties to gather or use personal 
information.”211 Article 42 prohibits the conveyance to others of 
personal data by network operators without consent from the user, 
meaning that consent is necessary to process data for another purpose 
that the one initially specified.212 The purpose specification principle is 
also expressly covered in the 2018 Specification, as the data controller 
should “have a legal, legitimate, necessary, and clear reason for 
processing personal information”213 and “express the purpose, 
methods, scope, and rules for processing personal information to the 
data subject and solicit their authorization and consent.”214 If a data 
controller wants to use the personal information for a purpose 
different from the one specified at the time of data collection, it should 
seek explicit consent from the individual.215 Here, China is in the wake 
of the European rules and diverges from the U.S., which does not 
afford the same level of protection and, for example, allows internet 
providers to sell users’ data without their consent to this purpose.216 
                                               
 210 OECD Privacy Guidelines ¶ 9; Convention 108 art. 5.b; GDPR art. 
5(1)b; Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C § 552a(e)(3); CCPA, 1798.100. (b). See Roos, supra 
note 50, at 111. 
 211 CSL art. 41. 
 212 CSL art. 42. 
 213 2018 Specification art. 4(b). 
 214 2018 Specification art. 4(c). 
 215 2018 Specification art. 7.3(c). 
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2. Limitations on Data Processing Activities 
The EU authorizes entities to only collect and process the 
amount of data necessary for the purpose specified to individuals, which 
constitutes the data minimization principle.217 Data no longer 
necessary should be deleted.218 The OECD Privacy Guidelines provide 
for softer rules, which only require that data should be relevant to the 
purposes for which they are to be used.219 As often with the U.S. data 
privacy approach, the existence and meaning of the data minimization 
requirement varies. It exists in the Privacy Act220 but none of its 
provisions explicitly limit data retention periods. The data 
minimization principle is absent from the FTC’s list of fair information 
practice principles but exists in the list provided by the Department of 
Homeland Security.221 It is not an express requirement in the CCPA. 
The U.S. approach therefore does not match the emphasis put on this 
principle by the EU,222 especially since the adoption of GDPR. 
The Chinese stance is dual. On the one hand, the CSL requires 
a soft minimization, as network operators are forbidden to collect 
personal information unrelated to the services they provide, which is 
more lenient than strict necessity.223 However, the first paragraph of 
article 41 does require the network operator to abide by the principle 
of necessity. This could be used to interpret the term “unrelated to” in 
a strict way.224 On the other hand, the 2018 Specification clearly sets a 
strict data minimization principle, with data processing permitted for 
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only what is necessary to the purposes,225 which exists in the 2013 MIIT 
Guideline as well.226 It further specifies that data should be deleted 
once the purpose specified is achieved.227 Here, the CSL remains closer 
to the U.S. but the 2018 Specification is in line with the EU. 
An even clearer distinction between the EU and the U.S. data 
privacy protections is the sensitivity principle, pursuant to which the 
processing of certain categories of data should be subject to additional 
safeguards.228 The requirement exists in EU rules for data such as 
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or 
trade union membership, criminal convictions, and the processing of 
genetic data, biometric data.229 The U.S. does not have an overarching 
principle providing additional safeguards to sensitive data,230 and in 
fact the opposition between the EU and the U.S. during the drafting 
of the OECD Privacy Guidelines resulted in the absence of this 
principle in the final text.231 
China leans towards the EU approach, but in its specific way—
one should recall that information on a person’s political or trade 
union affiliations are contentious in China. On the one hand, the CSL 
ignores sensitive data and doesn’t provide a definition or specific 
dispositions for them. Only certain sectorial laws contain restrictions 
regarding sensitive data.232 On the other hand, non-binding rules do 
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make the distinction and require additional protection for sensitive 
data. However, the definition of sensitive data differs with EU rules 
where sensitive data are clearly listed. Both the 2013 MIIT Guideline233 
and the 2018 Specification234 feature instead a risk-based definition for 
the identification of these data, that is much broader than in Europe. 
They are defined as those that, if disclosed or altered, could endanger 
the safety of persons or property, harm personal reputation and 
physical or psychological health, lead to discriminatory treatment, etc. 
The 2018 Specification then requires additional safeguards for 
handling sensitive data in subsequent articles.235 This definition is 
followed by a non-exhaustive list of examples, such as identification 
numbers, bank card numbers,236 health records, and bio-metrics data 
(the last two being personal sensitive information). Higher protection 
for sensitive data is common to China and Europe, but the risk-based 
approach is a Chinese characteristic. 
3. Enhanced Rights for Individuals 
Several direct rights that individuals enjoy under data 
protection laws belong to the participation principle, requiring that 
data subjects should be able to control and participate in the processing 
of their personal information by data controllers. The participation 
principle contains, in particular, the right for individuals to have access 
to their personal data, to request their correction, to control and to 
object to the processing, or to request the deletion of the data (also 
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known as the “right to be forgotten”).237 The OECD regards it as the 
most important privacy protection safeguard.238 The most recent 
among them are the right to be forgotten and the right to data 
portability. The right to request the deletion of personal data exists in 
China, although it is a weaker version of its EU equivalent. In the EU, 
the right to erasure that was a component of the right of access in the 
Directive 95/46/EC239 was strengthened in 2014 when the Court of 
Justice (“ECJ”) recognized the existence of the individual right to be 
forgotten in the Google Spain v. Costeja decision.240 The GDPR then 
made it a specific right.241 
The creation of a right to be forgotten in the EU was received 
with scepticism in the U.S.242 Critics like Eugene Volokh, a prominent 
scholar on American constitutional law, oppose the right to be 
forgotten on the basis of freedom of speech243 that the First 
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Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects. The debate is currently 
ongoing, with scholars finding elements of the right to be forgotten 
existing in the jurisprudence.244 Among the latest state laws, the CCPA 
now includes a right to deletion, with a First Amendment exception245 
(a similar exception exists in the GDPR).246 
The conceptual differences between China and the UN over 
the right to freedom of expression are well known.247 In addition to 
that, free speech activists sometimes criticize the right as a way to 
facilitate censorship.248 This could lead one to think that a right to be 
forgotten would be less problematic in China than in the U.S. 
However, in May 2016 (before the CSL took effect), the Haidian 
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District People’s Court in Beijing ruled in favor of Baidu, China’s main 
search engine, against a plaintiff invoking the right to be forgotten, 
from his right of name and right of reputation.249 The judges ruled 
there was no right to be forgotten in Chinese law, that the information 
was relevant and useful to the public because the information is recent 
and the plaintiff’s still works in the same field, the information is 
important for customers to make a judgment, and he was not part of 
a group that required special protection such as minors.250 
The right to erasure that exists in China since the 2012 NPC 
Decision251 is not actually as far reaching as the right to be forgotten in 
the EU. The right has been confirmed in the CSL but is limited to the 
cases where the network operator has violated laws or agreements 
between the parties.252 The 2018 Specification is in line with this.253 It 
goes further by requiring controllers to also notify third parties to 
whom data have been shared to delete them, as does the GDPR, but 
the requirement is still only applicable where a law or an agreement has 
been breached. None of the other grounds found in EU law to 
strengthen the right to erasure exist.254 Therefore, on the one hand the 
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right to deletion is more established in China than in most laws in the 
U.S. On the other hand, it remains narrower than EU or California 
rules. In the context of the drafting of the upcoming China’s 
comprehensive data protection law, several Chinese experts call for an 
extension of that right in the EU way.255 
Also, part of the new rights related to the participation 
principle, the right to data portability allows individuals to ask an 
organization to port their data directly to another organization or to 
receive them in an interoperable format. In the U.S., data portability is 
required in California,256 for certain health data in the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”),257 and the 
Obama administration launched the “My Data initiatives” to foster 
data portability in 2010,258 but there is no overarching requirement. 
Data portability as a data right that spans across sectors is a novelty 
from the GDPR.259 
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forgotten, and punitive measures against violations,” Sheng Wei, One year after GDPR, 
China strengthens personal data regulations, welcoming dedicated law, TECHNODE (June 19, 
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China follows the EU direction in the 2018 Specification, that 
grants the data portability right to individuals. It requires data 
controllers to give their personal information to data subjects or 
directly transfer them to a third party. However, this right is more 
limited than in the EU because it concerns only individuals’ basic 
information and information about their identities, and health, 
psychological, education and work information.260 This is another 
example where China offers more data rights than the U.S. without 
going as far as the EU. 
Finally, another area where China follows the EU in enhancing 
individuals’ rights is the restrictions on automated decision-making, 
including profiling. In the EU, a “data subject shall have the right not 
to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, 
including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her 
or similarly significantly affects him or her.”261 This provision is subject 
to several exceptions262 and, where a decision is taken, there needs to 
exist suitable safeguards to protect the individual’s rights, freedoms, 
and legitimate interests.263 This requirement is a feature that is specific 
to the EU approach on data protection.264 In the U.S., there is no 
similar general prohibition on decisions based solely on automated 
decision-making,265 although U.S. residents do enjoy certain rights to 
information or to contest in certain situations under specific laws, such 
as the Fair Credit Reporting Act or the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. 
The CSL does not mention automated processing or profiling, nor did 
previous Chinese laws. The 2018 Specification is the first legal 
instrument to define profiling266 and to require that in case of an 
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automated decision-making, the data controller should provide means 
for data subjects to lodge a complaint.267 
Among other similarities with EU rules found in the 2018 
Specification, details concerning organizational management or 
delegated processing reflect the influence of EU rules. For example, 
the data controller should conduct a security impact assessment to 
ensure that the data processor provides sufficient security safeguards 
and carry out an audit, as it should under the GDPR. Similarly, the data 
processor is bound to process data according to the controller’s 
instructions and cannot retain them after the relationship terminates. 
Requirements on organizational management found in the 
specification268 remind of the Data Protection Officer’s (“DPO”) 
mission assigned by the GDPR: data controllers should appoint a 
person responsible for personal data protection, whom should be in-
house if the controller crosses the defined thresholds.269 This person is 
in charge of implementing compliance within the organization and of 
tasks such as trainings, audits and personal data protection impact 
assessments. Those assessments recall the data protection impact 
assessments required by the GDPR.270 
The above shows that the latest Chinese rules indeed go 
beyond most U.S. laws and feature elements originating in EU law. 
However, this convergence is not linear, as there is still no sign of 
convergence on several principles. In addition, and crucially, data 
privacy remains lower in China than both the EU and the U.S. on 
several points. While on other aspects, China shows its own direction, 
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out of the paths that they traced out; those are China’s specificities on 
data privacy. 
V. DATA PRIVACY WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 
The previous developments assessed the convergence of China 
with a foreign model. But Chinese laws showcase significant 
characteristics which are not found in either the EU or the U.S. 
approaches, expressing China’s own rationale on personal data 
protection. They are strongly correlated with the particularity of 
China’s wider context and relate to outbound data transfers (IV.A) and 
the dichotomy between civil liberties and consumer privacy (IV.B). 
The specificities of China’s approach, combined with the influence the 
country may yield, are likely to bear significant consequences on policy 
developments in the EU, the U.S., and generally on fields heavily 
relying on personal data and such as artificial intelligence, which is at 
the core of China’s cyber-strategy (IV.C). 
A. Data Localization and Cross-Border Data Transfers: Impacts of 
the Cyber-Sovereignty Principle 
Data localization provisions (requiring that at least a copy of 
personal data should remain within the country’s border) and 
restrictions applied to cross-border transfers of personal data are 
among the legal elements that are most contentious and feature the 
least convergence between the three approaches. It is also where 
Chinese laws show most of their specificities but are the fuzziest so 
far. 
In the absence of an international treaty to which the EU, the 
U.S. and China would be parties, they each regulate data exchanges 
pursuant to their own requirements and philosophies. The U.S 
approach is the simplest, as there are no special requirements for 
transferring personal data from the U.S. to a third country. The U.S. is 
also among the strongest opponents to data localization restrictions, 
seen as trade barriers.271 Experts from the country call for prohibiting 
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digital trade barriers such as data localization laws in trade 
agreements,272 which has been recently illustrated in the now defunct 
proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.273 EU law is more 
restrictive but has no data localization requirement that would oblige 
certain personal information to remain within Europe. However, 
cross-border data transfers can happen only when respecting the level 
of protection set by the GDPR, therefore to third countries with a level 
of data protection which the European Commission recognizes as 
equivalent to the EU’s, or by using appropriate safeguards such as 
standard contractual clauses or binding corporate rules.274 This 
difference with the U.S. has been labelled as a “dramatic distinction” 
by legal scholars.275 
In China, requirements on the matter were mostly absent from 
previous laws. Now, they are directly impacted by the principle of 
cyberspace sovereignty, or cyber-sovereignty, that the CSL establishes 
in its Article 1.276 Cyber-sovereignty is part of the broader cyber-
strategy of China and geopolitical stance.277 Pursuant to this concept, 
the cyberspace is subordinated to the interests and values of a country 
within its borders, i.e. the application of state sovereignty to 
cyberspace; it’s opposed to the multi-stakeholder governance model 
that supports a free and open Internet.278 The cyber-sovereignty 
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concept was spurred by Edward Snowden’s revelations on foreign 
access to population and national security confidential data279 and 
embraced by China. To ensure its sovereignty over the cyberspace, a 
country may exert control over the Internet architecture, content, and 
data flows (exports but also imports, e.g. by blocking foreign content), 
often for security purposes. 
Regarding consequences on personal information protection, 
the cyber-sovereignty principle engenders requirements of localization 
of data storage and restrictions on cross-border data transfers. Article 
37 of the CSL requires “critical information infrastructure operators” 
that gather or produce personal information or important data during 
operations in China to store it in China. Those can be transferred out 
of the country, when it is truly necessary and after passing a security 
assessment280 (that has yet to be defined). A similar obligation to store 
personal information within the country is not found in either U.S. or 
EU law, but exists in other countries such as Russia.281 China’s 
government stance on data localization is that it protects individuals’ 
privacy, but also China’s economic development and reduces its 
exposure to foreign intelligence.282 These sweeping provisions were 
lobbied against by foreign companies and groups of interests. 
                                               
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/governing-cyberspace-state-control-vs-
multistakeholder-model. The authors note that “[t]he divide between nations that 
support governance models based on cyber sovereignty, primarily China and Russia, 
and those that believe in the multi-stakeholder model, including most liberal 
democracies, is one of the most prominent ideological conflicts dividing cyberspace.” 
 279 Marie Baezner & Patrice Robin, Trend Analysis: Cyber Sovereignty and Data 
Sovereignty, CSS 7 (Nov. 2018), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325335882_Trend_Analysis_Cyber_So
vereignty_and_Data_Sovereignty. The authors then introduce their differentiation 
between “strategic autonomy issues related to cybersecurity and cyber sovereignty as 
defined by International Law.” 
 280 CSL art. 37. 
 281 Federal Law No. 242-FZ on Amending Some Legislative Acts of the 
Russian Federation in as Much as It Concerns Updating the Procedure for Personal 
Data Processing in Information-Telecommunication Networks (with Amendments 
and Additions), enacted July 21, 2014 and took effect on September 1, 2016. 
Retrieved from https://pd.rkn.gov.ru/authority/p146/p191 (last visited Aug 25, 
2019). 
 282 Aimin Qi, Guosong Shao & Wentong Zheng, Assessing China’s 
Cybersecurity Law, 34 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 1342, 1353 (2018). 
2020 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 8:1 
106 
Eventually, data localization requirements were part of the final 
version of the CSL, but they were set to take effect months later than 
the rest of the CSL to grant companies more time to adapt.283 
However, the enforcement of those dispositions have been postponed 
again, sine die. While the press reported that this is meant to avoid 
exacerbating tensions amid the trade war context,284 the delay is also 
explained by the missing guidelines and texts that should bring more 
precision to the vague and ambiguous data-transfer provisions. 
Important questions are indeed still waiting for answers to decipher 
China’s approach: what are “critical information infrastructure 
operators,” do the requirements only apply to them, and what is the 
content of the prescribed “security assessment”? Two draft guidelines 
have been issued to provide some answers, the first in April 2017 never 
took effect, the second in June 2019.285 
China’s approach on cross-border data transfers is sensitive 
and spurs interest beyond the legal and privacy communities. These 
provisions are indeed at the crossroads of China’s concerns involving 
privacy, surveillance, sovereignty and economic development, that are 
all addressed within the CSL. Compared with EU and U.S. rules, they 
serve the need to retain data within the jurisdiction based on a rationale 
that goes beyond data privacy. China is still unfolding its measures to 
concretize its views; how it is done and whether it is successful may 
inspire countries with the same motivations as China— for example, 
on cyber-sovereignty—to transplant these rules into their own 
framework, as did China with U.S. and EU rules while developing its 
own approach of data privacy. 
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B. Surveillance and Privacy: The Data Protection Dichotomy in 
China 
What is striking in China’s system is the difference between the 
strengthening of protection against private entities and the parallel 
increase of government’s access to personal data, as there is still no 
significant privacy protection against government intrusion.286 
Whereas the rights to privacy and data protection evolved favorably 
for the individuals/consumers in their relations with the private sector, 
considerable criticism still exists when those rights are assessed in the 
context of the relation between the citizen and the government, 
particularly for surveillance issues.287 Surveillance is beyond the scope 
of this Article but, of course, it is far from being a Chinese practice 
only and the U.S. have been widely criticized for this, especially after 
Snowden’s revelations. However, a previous comparative study made 
by James D. Fry, Hong Kong Faculty of Law Professor, found that 
many rules exist in the U.S. to regulate surveillance activities, whereas 
the very few dispositions existing in China are inoperative in 
practice.288 In contrast, Chinese laws protect better and better 
individuals’ rights against private entities holding their data and grant 
individuals more control over their data. However, this progress is 
counterbalanced by the increase of the government’s access to data, 
spurred by innovations such as facial recognition. This dichotomy is 
observable in the CSL itself, which provides personal data protection 
but also contains articles limiting it on the basis of public and national 
security,289 such as building backdoors into software.290 
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The Chinese rationale is different from both the EU and the 
U.S. approaches. As presented above, the EU is compelled to adopt a 
high level of data protection because it is guaranteed as a fundamental 
right within its legal system. These strong requirements on data privacy 
concern both private entities and the government in a similar manner. 
In the U.S. privacy protection is primarily conceptualized as protection 
against government activities, a liberty against the state power, even 
before rules were enacted to protect consumer privacy. In China, 
within this sensitive context with different conceptualizations and 
rationales, it is the Chinese consumer’s data privacy protection that 
progresses, rather than a citizen’s. Whereas in Western countries 
human rights do protect the individual from state power, human rights 
in China are conceived as being derived from the state itself, meaning 
that the state’s interests remain above the individual’s.291 Moreover, the 
conditions to protect such rights are considered as not warranted in 
China today.292 This understanding explains why individuals are gaining 
significant data protection rights in the private sectors but “cannot 
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claim any remedies for the infringements of their privacy carried out 
by the state government.”293 
To reinforce the issue, cybersecurity is conceptualized as a 
component of national security. The CSL indeed follows the 
enactment of the National Security Law,294 which touches on personal 
data aspects where it allows the government to access information,295 
and the Counterterrorism Law296 which also contains provisions 
related to cybersecurity and data protection.297 The inherent 
consequence of this political and legal framework is that the collective 
interest outweighs individual freedoms and data privacy. The social 
credit system rating citizens based on their behavior and facial 
recognition in public areas for law enforcement purposes are the 
results of such balancing of interests. As says Xue Lan, former dean of 
the School of Public Policy and Management at Tsinghua University, 
“facial recognition may infringe on personal privacy to a certain degree, 
but it also brings a collective benefit, so it is a question of how to 
balance individual and societal benefits.”298 
This balance also goes the way of personal data protection. 
Despite this context and in contrary to a popular belief, Chinese people 
worry about the privacy of their personal data. According to a recent 
survey by the China Consumers Association, eighty-five percent of 
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people suffered a data leak, spurring public anger.299 The leakage of 
personal data indeed grew to unbearable levels. In 2016, it caused an 
91.5 billion RMB loss to the Chinese economy (about 13 billion 
USD).300 In addition, dramatic cases making the headlines move the 
public opinion and stimulate the debate around personal data 
protection. One such example is the Xu Yuyu case: following the 
disclosure of personal information, a scammer stole this eighteen-year-
old student’s money that her family had saved for her to go to college. 
The young girl then died of heart attack on the way back from the 
police station.301 
Facing this situation, China’s government has to act to better 
protect individuals’ data privacy. With a dual objective: Chinese 
consumers trust in the digital economy strengthens while the 
government becomes a privacy protector. China’s challenge is to 
secure the flow of personal data that is vital for the development of 
the digital economy, while ensuring the government’s control. This 
explains why, on the one hand, concerns rise about surveillance—for 
example around the social credit system302 and facial recognition—
while on the other hand, new rules go beyond the minimalist 
protections as found in the U.S., and towards the more protective EU 
model, forming China’s dual approach on personal data protection. 
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C. Artificial Intelligence Regulations as a Next Step and 
Consequences on EU and U.S. Policies 
EU, U.S., and China all take a different path on data protection, 
but they all support that it will foster the development of new business 
models related to personal data and new fields such as artificial 
intelligence (“AI”). AI indeed requires the collection and processing of 
large amounts of personal data to learn and make decisions, which 
conveys that data protection rules are—or will be—a central part of 
AI regulation. 
The last couple of years have seen the development of a race 
for the leadership in AI, which is fueled on personal data (e.g. facial 
recognition systems). As previously underlined here, China was a 
latecomer in data privacy regulation. But this is not the case for AI, 
which is a crucial part of China’s cyber strategy. In regard to this, 
opponents of stronger data protection laws in the U.S often use China 
as a convenient argument. According to the narrative developed, 
strengthening data privacy in the U.S. would be like a millstone around 
the neck of American companies, whereas their Chinese counterparts 
thrive from a lack of privacy regulation on their domestic market. For 
example, during Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate hearing following the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal, Facebook’s CEO called for avoiding 
regulations that would hurt U.S. innovation and favor Chinese 
competitors.303 “[W]e still need to make it so that American companies 
can innovate in [areas such as facial recognition], or else we’re going to 
fall behind Chinese competitors and others around the world who 
have different regimes.”304 Or, as a Credit Suisse executive puts, “what 
will make China be big in AI and big data is: China has no serious law 
protecting data privacy.”305 This narrative has started being disproved 
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by experts in the U.S.,306 and the present Article demonstrates that 
China lacks data protection rules but is now rapidly catching up, with 
a clear tendency towards requirements higher than the minimalist 
approach favored by the U.S. The fact that this progress undermines a 
common argument of opponents to the strengthening data privacy 
protection in the U.S. is a first important consequence of China’s new 
approach. 
The CSL is one of the laws that should build the relevant legal 
framework that China needs for a healthy development of AI. China 
outlined its strategy to become the leading AI power by 2030, through 
the Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan307 that 
the State Council released in July 2017. The plan outlines the need to 
“develop laws and regulations and ethical norms that promote the 
development of AI,” privacy being explicitly mentioned, as the first of 
six supporting measures.308 In March 2019, the Ministry of Science and 
Technology established the New Generation AI Governance Expert 
Committee (a committee composed with experts from academia and 
AI industry, tasked with researching policy recommendation for AI 
governance309) which released, in June 2019, eight governance 
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principles to develop responsible AI.310 The fourth principle being to 
“respect privacy” and the related individuals’ rights.311 Privacy is also 
part of the draft Joint Pledge on Artificial Intelligence Industry Self-
Discipline, issued by China’s Artificial Intelligence Industry Alliance in 
May 2019.312 This year, guidelines have been issued in various other 
countries and organizations, such as the UN, the Council of Europe, 
the OECD (China and Russia did not take part in it), the G20 and the 
European Union. So far, they remain general declarations that AI 
should be ethical. Going further, the EU also recently stated its goal to 
pass legislation that “should set a world-standard for AI regulation” 
with rights building on the GDPR.313 In China, the above-mentioned 
principles and official plan show that the country is decided to 
participate in laying out the theoretical foundations on which AI will 
evolve, with privacy among its fundamental principles and within the 
framework established by the CSL and the forthcoming Chinese 
personal data protection law.314 However, and pursuant to the Chinese 
dichotomy on data privacy identified in this Article,315 domestic 
companies working with the government on AI technologies involving 
privacy issues such as live facial recognition may be able to develop 
solutions within a less restrictive context than those working with the 
EU or U.S. governments—and successfully so, if one considers the 
example of Megvii, a Beijing-based startup specialized in facial 
                                               
 310 Governance Principles for a New Generation of Artificial Intelligence: 
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New Generation Artificial Intelligence Governance Expert Committee on June 17, 
2019, see Laskai and Webster, supra note 310. 
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 312 Joint Pledge on Artificial Intelligence Industry Self-Discipline (Draft for 
Comment), issued by the Artificial Intelligence Industry Alliance on May 31, 2019. 
Retrieved from newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/translation-
chinese-ai-alliance-drafts-self-discipline-joint-pledge/ (last visited Aug 26, 2019). 
 313 Mehreen Khan, EU plans sweeping regulation of facial recognition, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/90ce2dce-c413-11e9-a8e9-
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 314 See supra section II.C. 
 315 See supra section IV.B. 
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recognition, that may raise 1 billion USD in its coming initial public 
offering.316 
Therefore, the reinforcement of China’s rules on data 
protection bears meaning for both the EU and the U.S. The policy 
recommendation that can be made for each regime is largely different 
and reflects their opposite approaches. For the EU, China’s new 
direction ought to be seen favorably and both should collaborate on 
future AI regulation. However, the persisting dichotomy between 
privacy from companies and privacy from the government clashes with 
the EU value of personal data as a fundamental right, while data 
transfers from the EU to China are growing exponentially. In this 
context, the question is whether the current set of safeguards existing 
under the GDPR for these data flows, mainly contractual clauses, are 
sufficient and appropriate. A few initiatives to ignite a debate have 
been undertaken, such as an oral question to the European 
Commission from members of the EU Parliament,317 or a call from the 
president of Italy’s data protection authority for an EU-China Privacy 
Shield.318 The issue has received very little interest so far,319 and all the 
attention seems to be addressed at controversies over data flows from 
Europe to the U.S. instead (for problems akin to those of data flows 
from the EU to China), but observers tend to think that EU’s attention 
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may be more balanced between concerns on China and the U.S. in the 
near future.320 
The consequences that China’s approach on data protection 
should have on the U.S. are different. Opponents to the strengthening 
of data privacy in the U.S. cannot rely anymore on the argument saying 
that Chinese companies do not have to face privacy regulation in their 
domestic market. In addition to that, China intends to build privacy 
inside its AI regulation framework, as does the EU. If the U.S. does 
not depart from its minimalist approach, it risks letting the EU and 
China shape the future of AI regulation and the ethical use of personal 
data, as it did let the EU set the global standard for data privacy. 
However, the U.S. is now leading in the protection of personal data on 
the basis of national security. The concept of national security and its 
protection through limiting acquisition of American companies by 
foreign entities has recently been extended to include large controllers 
of personal data, as exemplified by the failed acquisition of Moneygram 
by China’s Ant Financial (part of Alibaba group).321 The Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) that reviews 
proposed deals for national security issues, now has jurisdiction over 
companies handling sensitive personal data, following the enactment 
of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 
(“FIRRMA”).322 
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China transplanted the CFIUS mechanism into its legal framework but does not yet 
expressly include concerns over the privacy of personal data into the national 
review’s scope. The EU recently passed a regulation for the screening of foreign 
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China, for its own part, should materialize and further its new 
direction into the forthcoming personal data protection law, which 
could help close the gap on consumer privacy with the most developed 
countries. This would help Chinese companies to better compete on 
the global market, where data protection laws are also improving, and 
place China in a better position to shape out the theoretical 
foundations of AI for its future development. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
China’s stance on data protection is the source of a lot of fear, 
controversies and skepticism. They build on the assumption that the 
use of personal data in China is unrestricted, causing a lack of privacy 
protection and giving an edge to Chinese companies in the field of 
innovation. Whereas the protection of personal information was 
indeed lacking until recently, the country is now building its framework 
at a rapid pace but scholarly literature on the topic is still relatively 
scarce. 
This Article has demonstrated that China gradually builds a 
data privacy system through the legal transplantation of both the EU 
and the U.S. reference models. It started from a path resembling the 
U.S. minimalist approach and now shows significant signs of 
convergence with the more stringent and comprehensive EU model. 
There are high chances that this trend will continue, and the law 
dedicated to data privacy that is on China’s legislative agenda should 
be the next milestone in that direction. 
This study has also underlined that China’s approach is not 
merely in between the EU and the U.S. It features important 
specificities that will make China’s approach, once the framework 
becomes more mature, a model itself that third countries sharing the 
same rationale may choose to transplant. Cyber-sovereignty and the 
dichotomy between privacy from private actors and privacy from the 
state are the most salient elements of the model that China is building. 
Given the country’s economic and political ambitions related to its 
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cyber strategy, China’s voice on data privacy will have an increasing 
impact. 
To further build up this finding, China shapes the related AI 
regulations that are intertwined with personal data usage. Unlike for 
personal data protection stricto sensu, China is not a latecomer here and 
will now be able to push its vision on AI rules, and participate with the 
EU and the U.S to the competition for global regulatory clout. The 
significant improvements identified in this study concerning consumer 
privacy will, hopefully, infuse into China’s future AI regulations. 
